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THE AFTERMATH OF UNITED STATES V.
VIRGINIA: WHY FIVE JUSTICES ARE





OLLOWING the landmark decision of United States v. Virginia,1 it
appeared the Supreme Court was moving toward using a stricter
form of intermediate scrutiny in gender-based equal protection
claims. Over the years, commentators 2 have argued that Justice Gins-
burg's use of "skeptical scrutiny" 3 and her heavy reliance on the "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" language in the majority opinion of Virginia
introduced a stricter test into cases involving gender-based classifications
as opposed to the traditional level of intermediate scrutiny established in
Craig v. Boren.4 Considering Justice Ginsburg's legal background and
her personal crusade against gender-based discrimination, 5 the Virginia
* Candidate for J.D., Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University,
May 2003; M.A., University of Texas at Dallas, 1997; B.A., University of Texas at Dallas,
1994. The author would like to thank Christopher Stobaugh.
1. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 35, 36 (1997).
3. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530.
4. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
5. In 1956, Ruth Bader Ginsburg began law school at Harvard. See Carol Pressman,
The House that Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and Justice, 14 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 311, 313 (1997). At the time, her husband, Martin, was also in law
school, and they had a one-year-old daughter. Id. at 312-13. When Martin graduated in
1959, the Ginsburgs moved to New York, so he could begin a new job. Id. at 314. Gins-
burg transferred to Columbia Law School, where she graduated first in her class-though
without any offers for employment. Id. at 311. Aided by one of her professors, Ginsburg
finally secured a judicial clerkship in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York. Id. Afterwards, she found her way into academia, teaching first at Rutgers
University Law School, then Harvard Law School, and finally Columbia Law School,
where she became a tenured professor. See Scott M. Smiler, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and The Virginia Military Institute: A Culmination of Strategic Success, 4 CARDOZO WO-
MEN'S L.J. 541, 544 (1998).
While teaching at Rutgers, Ginsburg began her noteworthy involvement with the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and, on its behalf, participated in the first U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, Reed v. Reed, to hold that a statute discriminating on the basis of
gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 547-51. Later, Ginsburg served as gen-
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decision suggested that the predominantly male Supreme Court was fi-
nally seeing gender-based discrimination through the eyes of a woman
and perhaps preparing to declare gender a suspect class.6
Despite such scholarly speculation about Virginia's positive impact on
future gender-based equal protection claims, it now appears not enough
weight was given to those Justices who had expressed a strong dislike for
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" language and had disapproved
of Justice Ginsburg's heavy reliance on it.7 It is no secret that the current
Supreme Court is split about whether gender is a suspect class.8 Since
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson,9 no Justice
has sought to explicitly declare gender-like race, national origin, or
alienage-suspect, thereby necessitating the use of strict scrutiny.10 It is
also no secret that some Members of the Court believe Justice Ginsburg
was using Virginia as the foundation upon which the Court could later
justify a decision ruling gender a suspect class." If the purpose of Vir-
ginia was to give the Court "the green," so to speak, then the purpose of
the Court's decision in Nguyen v. INS12 was to apply the brakes.
Nguyen, decided in the summer of 2001, represents a marked shift
away from the Court's gender-based equal protection analysis set forth in
Virginia. As one of the last facially discriminatory federal laws, the stat-
eral counsel and founding director of the national ACLU's Women's Rights Project
("WRP"), whose purpose was to identify "gender discrimination cases appropriate for Su-
preme Court review and to prepare briefs and arguments accordingly." Id. at 544. While
involved in the ACLU and WRP during the 1970s, Ginsburg wrote several amicus briefs
and argued six gender-based discrimination claims before the Court, losing only one. See
Pressman, supra note 5, at 314-15.
In 1980, President Carter appointed Ginsburg to the U.S. Court of Appeals, and in 1993,
she became the second female Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court after being nominated by
President Clinton. Id. at 315.
6. See infra note 85.
7. See, e.g., Virgina, 518 U.S. at 559, 568 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring; Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
8. The Court has never unanimously ruled that gender, like race, is a suspect class
falling within Justice Stone's famed footnote four in United States v. Caroline Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
9. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
10. "The Supreme Court has made it clear that differing levels of scrutiny will be ap-
plied [to laws that are challenged as violating equal protection] depending on the type of
discrimination." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
529 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1997). "Discrimination based on race or national origin [and
alienage, generally,] is subjected to strict scrutiny. . . . Strict scrutiny is virtually always
fatal to the challenged law." Id. The next highest level of scrutiny, intermediate, "is used
for discrimination based on gender and for discrimination against non-marital children."
Id. Finally, the Court subjects all other classifications, such as age, sexual orientation,
mental retardation, and poverty, to a rational basis test. "Rational basis review is the mini-
mum level of scrutiny that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet. ...
[R]arely have laws been declared unconstitutional for failing to meet this level of review."
Id. at 529-30. On an interesting note, some commentators have identified at least five
levels of scrutiny in the Court's equal protection analyses. In addition to the three enumer-
ated levels, scholars have identified a "higher intermediate scrutiny" in cases like Virginia
and "rational basis with bite" in decisions like Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Id. at
536.
11. See infra § IV.
12. 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
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ute at issue in Nguyen seemed destined for invalidation, particularly in
light of precedent. Five Justices, however, upheld the statute, leaving
both the dissent and commentators baffled as to how the Court reached
its decision. In an attempt to understand that decision, the dissenting Jus-
tices, on the one hand, have argued that the majority in Nguyen used
rational basis review to uphold the statute rather than subjecting it to true
intermediate scrutiny. 13 Commentators, on the other hand, have sug-
gested that the plenary power doctrine may be one reasonable justifica-
tion for the Court's holding and its use of deferential review. 14
This article asserts that neither position fully explains what occurred in
Nguyen and that, instead, five Justices united to pull in the reins on the
use of the "exceedingly persuasive justification," which they believe im-
poses a higher level of scrutiny on gender-based classifications under Jus-
tice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion.1 5 In other words, five Justices saw this
area of the Court's jurisprudence moving in a direction they did not sup-
port-toward treating gender as a suspect class-and they used Nguyen
to prevent that result. As such, scholars are now left speculating about
the impact of Nguyen on future gender-based equal protection claims and
left waiting to see if Virginia's "exceedingly persuasive justification" will
prevail.
II. ARRIVING AT INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court took over three years to decide what level of scru-
tiny applies to laws making distinctions on the basis of gender. In Reed v.
Reed,16 the Court held for the first time that a law discriminating on the
basis of gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee. The Idaho statute at issue in Reed established a preference for
males over females as estate administrators.1 7 In striking down the stat-
ute, the majority claimed to apply a rationality test; yet, the Court utilized
the language from Ruth Bader Ginsburg's ACLU brief,18 which stated
that laws distinguishing on the basis of gender must "rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship"1 9 to the
governmental objective. As a pivotal decision, Reed established prece-
dent on which the Court would later justify its use of intermediate scru-
tiny in gender-based equal protection claims.
Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,20 the Court held that a fed-
eral statute giving preferential treatment to men in the uniformed ser-
vices with dependent wives violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
13. See infra § VI, A.
14. See infra § VI, B.
15. See infra § VI, C.
16. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
17. Id.
18. See Pressman, supra note 5, at 323-24.
19. Id. at 328.
20. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Clause. 21 That statute allowed men to automatically claim their wives as
dependents, while requiring women in the uniformed services to actually
show that their husbands were more than fifty percent dependent on
them for support.22 Though eight23 Justices agreed that the statute was
unconstitutional, they struggled to agree on the appropriate standard of
review for gender-based claims. Justice Brennan, perhaps too eager to
set the standard in this area, announced that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scru-
tiny. '" 24 Only four Justices agreed on this point,25 and a majority of the
Court has never declared gender a suspect class.
In 1976, the Court finally settled on the use of intermediate scrutiny for
gender-based classifications. Craig v. Boren26 involved a challenge to an
Oklahoma statute that permitted women to purchase 3.2 percent beer at
the age of eighteen yet denied men the same right until they turned
twenty-one. 27 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan enunciated a
new standard for gender-based equal protection claims-intermediate
scrutiny-and this time he was backed by a majority. Rather than de-
clare gender a suspect class, the Court accepted Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
intermediate scrutiny test 28 as proposed in her ACLU amicus brief.29
Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court stated that laws making distinc-
tions on the basis of gender must be "substantially related to an impor-
tant governmental objective."'30 The intermediate standard established in
Craig has endured and, despite the forecasts and arguments made by
some commentators, remains the core focus of the Court's gender-based
equal protection analysis today, as demonstrated by its latest decision in
Nguyen.31
III. THE RISE OF AN EXCEEDINGLY
PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION
Massachusetts v. Feeney32 was the first case to use the "exceedingly per-
21. Since a federal statute was at issue, the Court's analysis focused on whether the
law violated the Fifth Amendment. Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an
Equal Protection Clause, it is well-settled that, via an incorporation theory, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government by way of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
22. Fronterio, 411 U.S. at 678.
23. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
24. Fronterio, 411 U.S. at 688.
25. Id. at 677.
26. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
27. Id. at 191-92.
28. Although the term "intermediate scrutiny" was not coined by Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, her brief set forth the language of this test. See Pressman, supra note 5, at 327-28.
29. Id.
30. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Though still a form of heightened scrutiny, the intermediate
level is less demanding than strict scrutiny as applied in Fronterio and more rigorous than
the rationality test utilized in Reed. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10.
31. See infra § V.
32. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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suasive justification" language in the context of gender-based equal pro-
tection. In Feeney, the Court (7-2) 33 upheld the Massachusetts veterans'
preference statute, which gave preferential treatment to veterans apply-
ing for civil service jobs.34 Although roughly sixty percent of Massachu-
setts' public jobs fell into the civil service category35 and approximately
ninety-eight percent of the veterans in the state were male at the time the
suit was filed,36 the Court held that the statute did not purposefully dis-
criminate against women.37 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart reit-
erated the intermediate standard from Craig v. Boren and further noted
that any law "overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in
public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification
to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. '38
Since the first case to use this language upheld, rather than nullified,
the challenged law, this is strong evidence that the "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" standard was not intended to add a higher level of scru-
tiny to the intermediate test. Indeed, the Court, in all likelihood, did not
intend for those words to carry as much force as they did in subsequent
cases like Virginia.39
Two years later, the Court reiterated the "exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication" language in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.40 In that case, Joan Feenstra
challenged a Louisiana statute that allowed her husband to dispose of
their community property without her consent. 41 Writing for the major-
33. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.
34. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281.
35. Id. at 262.
36. Id. at 270.
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
39. For example, the current Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, who now strongly op-
poses the use of that language as part of the intermediate scrutiny test, was one of the
concurring Justices in Feeney.
40. 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
41. Id. at 457. The facts of Kirchberg are as follows: In 1974, Joan Feenstra alleged
that her husband, Harold Feenstra, molested their minor daughter. Id. Mr. Feenstra re-
tained an attorney, Karl Kirchberg, to defend him. Id. In consideration for Mr. Kirch-
berg's legal services, Mr. Feenstra signed a $3000 promissory note, using their home as
security. Id. Mrs. Feenstra was not aware of this arrangement. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 457.
Eventually Mrs. Feenstra dropped the charges against her husband, and they became le-
gally separated. Id. Mrs. Feenstra continued to reside in their home while Mr. Feenstra
moved to another state. Id.
In 1976, Mrs. Feenstra became aware of the promissory note when Mr. Kirchberg
threatened to foreclose on her home because her ex-husband had defaulted on the debt.
Id. Mr. Kirchberg filed suit against Mrs. Feenstra, and she filed a counterclaim, asserting
that the statute giving her husband the power to dispose of their home without her consent
was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 457-58. Although Louisiana re-
pealed the section of the statute at issue in 1980 while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court reviewed whether the statute was uncon-
stitutional at the time Mr. Feenstra mortgaged the home in 1974. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at
458. The Court of Appeals determined that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 459.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Kirchberg argued that the Fifth Circuit's judg-
ment was not meant to work retroactively; therefore, he could still foreclose on Mrs. Feen-
stra's home. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the statute violated the Fourteenth
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ity, Justice Marshall affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to overturn
the statute. 42 In so doing, he stated that "the burden remains on the
party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly discriminates on the basis
of sex to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the chal-
lenged classification."'43 Using this language in conjunction with the in-
termediate scrutiny test, Justice Marshall explained that "[b]ecause
appellant has failed to offer such a justification, and because the State...
has apparently abandoned 44 any claim that an important government ob-
jective was served by the statute, we affirm the judgment. '45
Interestingly, the manner in which Justice Marshall set out the above
standard makes intermediate scrutiny look like a two-part test. In other
words, it appears Mr. Kirchberg not only had to show an "exceedingly
persuasive justification," but also an "important governmental objec-
tive."'46 Though seemingly trivial on the surface, this difference is signifi-
cant since today's Court does not agree on whether the "exceedingly
persuasive justification" language is an addition to or a restatement of the
traditional intermediate scrutiny test. In fact, some Justices have written
separate concurring opinions or dissents based on this point.47 Moreover,
if the "exceedingly persuasive" standard adds a second tooth to the inter-
mediate test, a new burden is imposed on the party seeking to justify a
statute. As this article later discusses, the Court's decision in Nguyen
seems to suggest that a majority of Justices prefer the more limited appli-
cation of the language-that the "exceedingly persuasive" language is
merely a restatement of, and not an addition to, the intermediate test.48
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mississippi University for Women v. Ho-
gan49 served as an important stepping stone in the Court's gender-based
equal protection jurisprudence. In Hogan, a 5-4 majority ruled that the
nursing school's no-male admissions policy at Mississippi University for
Women ("MUW") violated the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Although the
policy discriminated against men rather than women, Justice O'Connor
explained that intermediate scrutiny applies evenhandedly in all gender-
based claims, despite the claimant's sex.5'
Amendment and that the Court of Appeals' decision served to invalidate the agreement
between Mr. Kirchberg and Mr. Feenstra, though the Court did not answer whether its
decision would apply to other mortgages executed under the statute prior to its being re-
pealed. Id. at 461-63.
42. Id. at 461.
43. Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273).
44. The State of Louisiana did not challenge the Court of Appeals' decision.
45. Kirchberg, 450 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added).
46. Since the State of Louisiana did not join Mr. Kirchberg's appeal to the Supreme
Court, one questions whether he could have prevailed in the absence of the State asserting
that the statute had, at one time, advanced an important governmental interest.
47. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559, 568 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring; Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
48. See infra § V.
49. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).




Setting forth a comprehensive intermediate standard which had been
developing from a decade of case law, Justice O'Connor stated:
[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on
the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. The burden
is met only by showing at least that the classification serves "impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."'52
By expressly joining the two standards, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Hogan made the "exceedingly persuasive justification" an integral part of
the intermediate scrutiny test. Moreover, since she used the traditional
intermediate standard as a way to describe how to satisfy the "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" burden, a strong argument can be made
that the primary focus of the test became whether a party proved an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" rather than an "important governmen-
tal objective."
Justice O'Connor's use of the words "at least" has also been a point of
controversy among scholars. Some commentators have argued that she
used these words to make the intermediate standard more exacting.
53
For example, it is unclear in Hogan whether the government only had to
show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" or whether it had to show
at least that and perhaps something more. Whatever Justice O'Connor's
intentions were by emphasizing the words "at least," the day the "exceed-
ingly persuasive" language would dominate the Court's gender-based
equal protection analysis was not too far around the corner.
54
More than a decade after Hogan, the Court reaffirmed the "exceed-
ingly persuasive" language in J.E.B. v. Alabama.55 In J.E.B., the Court
examined whether gender could serve as a legitimate basis for a preemp-
tory strike.56 Like Reed v. Reed, J.E.B. involved alleged discrimination
against men. The petitioner in J.E.B. argued that the State had used its
preemptory strikes to remove male jurors from a paternity and child-sup-
port case. 57 As evidence of this, petitioner pointed to the fact that the
final jury was comprised of all women.58 Six Justices were persuaded by
the petitioner's evidence and agreed that "[i]ntentional discrimination on
the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection
Clause .. ."59
52. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
53. See Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring Circus: The Adventure Continues into the
Twenty-first Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 271, 314 (2000); see also Collin O'Connor Udell,
Signaling A New Direction In Gender Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29
CONN. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1996).
54. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
55. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
56. Id. at 129.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 130-31.
2002] 1761
SMU LAW REVIEW
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun echoed Justice O'Connor in
Hogan: "Under our equal protection jurisprudence, gender-based classifi-
cations require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny."'60 The Court found no such justification in
this case.61 Though J.E.B. has received less attention than other cases in
this area of the Court's jurisprudence, this case made evident that the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" was an essential part of the inter-
mediate test. What was left to be seen, however, was whether that stan-
dard imposed a higher burden on the party trying to justify a statute than
did intermediate scrutiny. Many believe Justice Ginsburg answered this
question affirmatively in United States v. Virginia.62
IV. UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA: THE COURT'S
"CORE INSTRUCTION"
The crucial case in this area of the Court's jurisprudence is, of course,
United States v. Virginia.63 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion (7-1)64 ex-
plicitly focused on the "exceedingly persuasive justification" language
rather than the traditional intermediate test. Applying that language, the
Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI") exclusion of wo-
men from the state-funded school deprived women of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. 65 Moreover, the Court deter-
mined that the remedial women's school, the Virginia Women's Institute
for Leadership ("VWIL"), established by VMI after the Fourth Circuit's
ruling, did not legitimize VMI's discriminatory admissions policy. 66
Virginia involved a challenge to one of the nation's oldest state-funded,
single-sex military institutes.67 According to the school's mission state-
ment, VMI set out to produce "'citizen soldiers"' through an "'adversa-
tive"' teaching method, which established a pecking order among
students in an atmosphere similar to Marine Corps boot camp.68 The
school believed this type of teaching method, which had been used at
VMI since its inception in 1839, was inappropriate for females, who were
therefore excluded from the school. 69
In 1990, a female high-school student seeking admission to VMI filed a
complaint with the Attorney General's office challenging VMI's all-male
60. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136.
61. Despite the Court's holding, some Justices attempted to limit the scope of the deci-
sion, recognizing preemptory challenges as an important litigator's tool and integral part of
the jury selection process. Justice O'Connor, in particular, was careful to note that the
Court's decision should only apply to the government's use of preemptory strikes, and not
to private civil litigants or criminal defendants, since the Fourteenth Amendment only pro-
hibits discrimination by state actors. Id. at 147, 150.
62. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision.
65. Virgina, 518 U.S. at 534.
66. Id. at 555-56.
67. Id. at 520-21.
68. Id. at 522.
69. Id. at 523.
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admissions policy. 70 The United States sued the school and the Common-
wealth of Virginia, arguing that VMI's exclusion of women constituted
gender-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 71 Applying Hogan, the District Court held for the school, reason-
ing that single-sex education, which served to diversify the learning expe-
rience, advanced an important governmental objective.72 Thus, the
District Court reasoned that the "only means of achieving that objective"
was "'to exclude women . . .'73 from VMI. In the eyes of the District
Court, the admissions policy survived intermediate scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected this reasoning,
however, and vacated the District Court's holding.74 The Fourth Circuit
stated that "Virginia has not ... advanced any state policy by which it can
justify its determination, under an announced policy of diversity, to afford
VMI's unique type of program to men and not to women. ' 75 But the
Fourth Circuit's holding was not a complete win for women in the arena
of single-sex education because the court also determined that "three as-
pects of VMI's program-physical training, the absence of privacy, and
the adversative approach-would be materially affected by co-educa-
tion."'76 As such, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case, instructing Vir-
ginia to devise a remedial plan, such as admitting women to VMI;
establishing parallel institutions or programs; or abandoning state sup-
port, leaving VMI free to pursue its policies as a private institution.77
Complying with this instruction, Virginia proposed establishing VWIL,
a parallel school for women only.78 On remand, the District Court ap-
proved of VWIL, determining that the alternate school remedied the dis-
crimination in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 A divided
Court of Appeals affirmed,80 but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.81
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg examined whether VMI's
all-male admissions policy denied women equal protection of the law and,
if so, what remedial action must be taken to comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment. 82 At the start of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg set forth the
standard by which these questions would be measured: "Parties who seek
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' for that action. '83 Rather than labeling this
traditional intermediate scrutiny, Justice Ginsburg coined a new term,
70. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
73. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523.
74. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 892.
76. Id. at 896-97.
77. Id. at 900.
78. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 526.
79. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 473 (W.D. Va. 1994).
80. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.1995).
81. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
82. Id. at 530-31.
83. Id. at 530 (internal citations omitted).
1763
SMU LAW REVIEW
"skeptical scrutiny, '84 which created a stir among scholars8 5 and Mem-
bers of the Court.8 6 Moreover, she stated that the "core instruction"8 7 of
the Court's analysis would focus on the "exceedingly persuasive" stan-
dard rather than whether the State had asserted "an important govern-
mental objective" that was "substantially related" to that end.
After tracing the long history of discrimination against women,88 Jus-
tice Ginsburg defined the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard.
She stated that "[t]he burden of the justification is demanding and it rests
entirely on the State .... And it must not rely on overbroad generaliza-
tions about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females .... 'Inherent differences between men and women ... remain
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity.'"89
She then announced the Court's holding: "Measuring the record in this
case against the review standard just described, we conclude that Virginia
has shown no 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for excluding all wo-
men from the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI." 90 The Court
also ruled that VWIL was not an appropriate remedy for this discrimina-
tion: "Women seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be of-
fered anything less, under the Commonwealth's obligation to afford them
genuinely equal protection." 91
Though seven of the eight participating Justices concurred in the judg-
ment, only six of them appeared to sanction Justice Ginsburg's strong
reliance on the "exceedingly persuasive" standard. 92 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, for example, wrote separately to express his concern over the
Court's application of this language and its effect on the intermediate
scrutiny test. He opined that the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language should be used as it was in Massachusetts v. Feeney, only to re-
state the traditional intermediate test. 93 He strongly objected to the
84. Id.
85. Many scholars have argued that Virginia was Justice Ginsburg's attempt to apply
strict scrutiny to gender-based claims and to finally label gender a suspect class. See
Smiler, supra note 5, at 578-584; see Marks, supra note 53, at 324-33. See generally, Amy
Walsh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Extending the Constitution, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 197
(1998); see generally Deborah L. Brake, Reflections of the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GEN-
DER SOC. POL'Y & L. 35 (1997).
86. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558-65 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" should not be an integral part of the intermediate
scrutiny test); Id. at 565-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of using some-
thing other than intermediate scrutiny to arrive at its holding).
87. Id. at 531.
88. Part of the Court's traditional analysis in cases involving the application of strict
scrutiny, like those based on racial discrimination, includes a discussion of the history of
the discrimination against that particular class of people. One can argue that in this respect
Justice Ginsburg's analysis does more closely resemble the Court's analysis in cases requir-
ing strict scrutiny.
89. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
90. Id. at 534.
91. Id. at 557.
92. Id. at 558, 566 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring; Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559; see also infra § VI, C.
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Court using the "exceedingly persuasive" language to impose a higher
burden on the party seeking to justify a statute. In retrospect, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Virginia is best viewed as an admo-
nition that he would fight to ensure that the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" did not carry great force in the Court's later decisions.
As the sole dissenter, Justice Scalia wrote not only to assert his disap-
proval of the Court's analysis but also to express his view that VMI's all-
male admissions policy did not offend the Constitution. 94 Disavowing the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" standard as part of the intermedi-
ate test, Justice Scalia implied that the majority used this standard to ap-
ply strict scrutiny under the guise of an intermediate test.95
Though the Court's holding in Virginia seemed, on the surface, a cause
for celebration in the fight against gender-based discrimination and
though it appeared a majority of the Court may have been forming to
finally declare gender a suspect class, it would soon become clear that this
was not the case. Rather, the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, which both opposed Justice Ginsburg's strong reliance on
the "exceedingly persuasive" standard, would resonate just five years
later in Nguyen v. INS.96
V. NGUYEN V. INS: PULLING IN THE REINS ON THE
"EXCEEDINGLY PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION"
In Nguyen v. INS,97 the Court upheld a federal statute requiring un-
married fathers to take more stringent steps than unmarried mothers in
conferring U.S citizenship on their nonmarital children. 98 Tuan Nguyen
was born in Vietnam in 1969 to a Vietnamese mother and a U.S. citizen
father, who were not married. 99 After his parents' relationship ended,
Nguyen lived with his father's girlfriend in Vietnam until he was five
years old,100 at which point he moved to Texas where he was raised by his
father until he was an adult.10 1 When Nguyen was twenty-two, he
pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child. 10 2 The Immigra-
94. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566-603.
95. Id. at 568 ("1 have no problem with a system of abstract tests ... though I think we
can do better than applying strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny whenever we feel like
it.") (internal parentheses omitted).
96. 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
97. Id.
98. Although Nguyen concerned discrimination against men (i.e., fathers), the dissent
asserted that the statute actually served to reinforce stereotypes against women. As Justice
O'Connor opined, "Section 1409 (a)(4) is the paradigmatic of a historic regime that left
women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children....
The majority, . . . rather than confronting the stereotypical notion that mothers must care
for these children and fathers may ignore them, quietly condones the 'very stereotype the
law condemns."' Id. at 2076.
99. Id. at 2057.
100. Id. Nguyen did not stay in contact with his mother and never lived with her after





tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") sought to deport him to Vietnam
as a result of his criminal convictions. 10 3
Initially, Nguyen testified that he was a Vietnamese citizen, so an Im-
migration Judge declared him deportable. 10 4 But Nguyen later claimed
that he was a U.S. citizen like his father, and he appealed the Immigra-
tion Judge's decision. 10 5 During this time, Nguyen's father obtained an
order of parentage based on a DNA test that revealed a 99.8%
probability of his paternity. 10 6 Nevertheless, the Immigration Board re-
jected Nguyen's appeal because he and his father had failed to satisfy the
requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) by establishing Nguyen's citizen-
ship prior to his eighteenth birthday. 0 7
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), the following requirements must be met for
a nonmarital child to receive U.S. citizenship if the citizen parent is the
father and the mother is an alien:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of
the person's birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide fi-
nancial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18
years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence
or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court. 108
By contrast, where a nonmarital child's mother is a U.S. citizen and the
father an alien, § 1409(c) allows the child to automatically receive the
mother's citizenship status at birth if she "had the nationality of the
United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had
previously been physically present in the United States or one of its out-
lying possessions for a continuous period of one year."'10 9
Claiming that § 1409(a)(4) discriminated against fathers on the basis of
gender in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 1 0 Nguyen and his father
appealed the Immigration Board's decision to the Fifth Circuit, which up-
held the statute."1 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed" 2 the
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057.
106. Id. at 2057, 2072.
107. Id. at 2057. Cf. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (the statute used to give the
father until the child's twenty-first birthday to establish citizenship).
108. Id. at 2058.
109. Id. at 2058-59.
110. See supra note 21.
111. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000).
112. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
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Fifth Circuit's ruling. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
claimed1 13 to subject the statute to intermediate scrutiny, relying not on
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" language, as was the case in
Virginia, but instead on the traditional language set forth in Craig v. Bo-
ren. As he explained, "[f]or a gender-based classification to withstand
equal protection scrutiny, it must be established at least that the [chal-
lenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives. '114 Though not a complete departure
from the Court's analysis in Virginia, this was quite different from Justice
Ginsburg's use of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" as the Court's
"core instruction" in that case.
Justice Kennedy's analysis found that § 1409(a)(4) served two impor-
tant governmental interests. First, the government had an important in-
terest in ensuring the existence of a biological parent-child
relationship.' 1 5 Second, the government had an interest in assuring that
"the child and citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or po-
tential to develop ... a real, meaningful relationship. ' 16
As for the first interest, the Court explained that the birthing process
itself verifies the biological relationship between the mother and her
child.11 7 Moreover, in the mother's case, documentation, such as birth
certificates, medical records, and witnesses at the birth, assist in this ver-
ification. 118 By contrast, the majority found that verifying the biological
relationship between a father and his child is more difficult. For example,
a father may not be present at the birth, and even if he is, his presence "is
not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.' 1 9 Since mothers and fathers
are not similarly situated in the birthing process, the Court rationalized
that "a different set of rules" for determining the existence of a biological
relationship is "neither surprising nor troubling from a constitutional
perspective.' 20
As for the second important governmental interest, assuring that the
citizen parent and child have "an opportunity to develop a meaningful
relationship,"' 2' the majority reasoned that this opportunity exists auto-
matically for the mother since she must be present at her own child's
birth.122 The father, by contrast, may not even know of his child's exis-
113. Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, accused the majority of applying a lower level of scrutiny to the statute at issue. Id.
at 2066-79.
114. Id. at 2059 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 2060-61.
116. Id.




121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061.
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tence, or the mother may not know the father's identity.123 By this rea-
soning, § 1409(a)(4) arguably does for the father what giving birth does
for the mother: assures initial contact between the father and child, so at
least there is an opportunity for a meaningful relationship to develop.
Having established these two important objectives, the Court next
turned to a means-end analysis and found that the statute was "substan-
tially related" to important governmental objectives. Rejecting Nguyen's
arguments that knowledge alone does not guarantee a parent-child rela-
tionship and that § 1409(a)(4) is based on the stereotype that mothers are
more likely than fathers to develop caring relationships with their chil-
dren, 124 the Court said, "[i]t is almost axiomatic that a policy which seeks
to foster the opportunity for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop
has a close and substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the
actual formation of that bond."'1 25 As both interests satisfied intermedi-
ate scrutiny, the Court declared that the fit between the statute and the
government's objectives was "exceedingly persuasive."' 126
In sharp contrast to Justice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy only referred to the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard
twice in his opinion. 27 Moreover, the language was not used as an inte-
gral part of the Court's analysis as it had been in the past. For example,
the first time Justice Kennedy used the language was merely to assert that
the "exceedingly persuasive" standard had been met. Although he stated
that "[t]he fit between the means and the important end is 'exceedingly
persuasive.' See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, ' ' 128 Justice Kennedy did not
explain how he reached that conclusion. Furthermore, the second time
Justice Kennedy referred to the language in his opinion was simply to
recite its meaning: "We have explained that an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' is established 'by showing at least that the classification
serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."' Hogan, supra, at 724 (citations omitted). Section 1409
meets this standard." 129
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy relied on Justice O'Connor's definition
of an "exceedingly persuasive justification," as asserted in Hogan, rather
than Justice Ginsburg's fuller definition set forth in Virginia. This incites
curiosity as one notes that Justice Kennedy referenced Virginia when de-
claring that the burden was met but cited Hogan when describing the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2064. But see id. at 2073 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("bare assertion of what
is allegedly 'almost axiomatic,' however, is no substitute for the 'demanding' burden of
justification borne by the defender of the classification") (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at
533).
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standard.1311 Perhaps Justice Kennedy has now decided, after reflecting
on Virginia, that he does not agree with Justice Ginsburg's use of the
"exceedingly persuasive" language or her "skeptical scrutiny," and he
and the other majority Justices saw Nguyen as an opportunity to make
this point.
Even more interesting is that Justice Kennedy's opinion appears, at
least on the surface, inconsistent with his previous decisions foreshad-
owing how he would rule on the statute at issue in Nguyen. For instance,
just three years earlier in Miller v. Albright,'3 ' the Court examined the
same statute but failed to reach a unanimous decision. In that case, peti-
tioner Lorelyn Miller was born in the Phillippines to a Filipino mother
and a U.S. citizen father, who were never married. 32 In 1992, one month
after Miller's twenty-first birthday, her father, who lived in Texas, filed a
petition to establish his paternity. 133 Upon the Texas court entering a
decree of paternity, Miller, who was still living in the Phillippines, applied
for U.S. citizenship. 34 Her application was denied since paternity was
not established until after her twenty-first birthday. 35 Miller, like
Nguyen, claimed that the statute at issue discriminated against fathers in
violation of equal protection. 13 6 Though six' 37 Justices affirmed the
Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the statute, a majority did not do so
by the same reasoning.
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the statute
against equal protection challenge, finding that it was not based on im-
permissible stereotypes but rather on legitimate biological differences be-
tween mothers and fathers. 138 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
wrote a concurring opinion stating that Congress' plenary powers139 in
the context of immigration and naturalization prevented the Court from
granting the requested relief-conferring citizenship on Miller. 40
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy did not reach the merits of the equal
protection claim. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that
Miller lacked standing in the absence of her father as a party to the law-
suit.141 But if Miller's father had been a party to the suit, Justice
O'Connor said, in dicta, that she would have invalidated the statute, as it
130. Id.
131. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
132. Id. at 425.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 425-26.
135. Id. at 426. Since Miller was born prior to 1986, she fell within the "narrow age
bracket whose Members may elect to have the preamendment law apply," which estab-
lished that the requirements of the statute be met by the age of twenty-one as opposed to
the age of eighteen, as in Nguyen's case. Id. at 426 n.3.
136. Id. at 426.
137. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer dissented.
138. Miller, 523 U.S. at 442-45.
139. See infra § VI, B (discussing the plenary power doctrine).
140. Miller, 523 U.S. at 453-59.
141. Id. at 446. Initially, Miller's father was a party to the original lawsuit. Id.
1769
SMU LAW REVIEW
failed intermediate scrutiny. 142 Justice Kennedy appeared to concur with
Justice O'Connor on this point, yet he later wrote the majority opinion in
Nguyen, upholding the same statute in stark contrast with Justice
O'Connor's statements in Miller. Justice Kennedy's unexplained switch
and the majority's lack of reliance on the "exceedingly persuasive" stan-
dard in Nguyen raise serious questions about the level of scrutiny the
Court applied in that case and, even more unsettling, what standard the
Court will use in future gender-based discrimination claims.
The Nguyen decision has thrown a distinct twist in what was beginning
to look like an established area of constitutional law. Since that holding,
we are left wondering which test dominates-the intermediate scrutiny as
used in Craig or the "exceedingly persuasive justification" as used in Vir-
ginia, and if the former, how the latter fits in, if at all. To answer those
questions, one must examine the possible justifications for the Court's
decision in Nguyen as well as each majority Justice's motive for upholding
the statute.
VI. RECONCILING NGUYEN WITH VIRGINIA
There is much speculation about how the majority Justices reached
their decision in Nguyen considering the Supreme Court's precedents in
this area. Both the dissenting Justices and commentators have accused
the majority of using a lower standard of review, as neither appears to
believe that the statute at issue actually survives intermediate scrutiny.
The dissenting Justices have pointed the finger at the Court's misuse of
rational basis review, while some scholars have searched for justification
in the doctrine of plenary power. This article asserts that neither theory
satisfactorily explains the Court's misfit decision in Nguyen. Instead, it
appears that five Justices banded together to stop what they believed was
a potential threat to the traditional level of intermediate scrutiny, the
"exceedingly persuasive justification," as this language was setting the
stage for the Court to declare gender a suspect class.
A. THE DISSENT'S JUSTIFICATION: RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
The dissent in Nguyen bluntly accused the majority Justices of using a
rational basis test, merely labeled as intermediate scrutiny, to uphold
§ 1409(a)(4). In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that, consistent
with rational basis review, the Court hypothesized governmental interests
and failed to show that those interests were actual purposes in enacting
§ 1409(a)(4). 143 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the
burden of justifying its gender-based distinctions, and the Court "must
determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persua-
sive.'"1 44 Thus, the Court may not hypothesize interests that the govern-
142. Id. at 452.
143. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2071.
144. Id. at 2067 (emphasis added).
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ment itself has not offered, as it can when applying rational basis. 145 In
defending the statute, the INS relied on two important interests: first, as-
suring that "children who are born abroad and out of wedlock have, dur-
ing their minority, attained a sufficiently recognized or formal
relationship to their United States parent... and second, preventing such
children from being stateless. '' 146 Conversely, the majority framed the
government's interests in terms of ensuring the existence of a biological
parent-child relationship and assuring that "the child and citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop . . . a real,
meaningful relationship.' 1 47 The dissent noted that "this disparity be-
tween the majority's defense of the statute and the INS' proffered justifi-
cations is striking, to say the least."'1 48
According to the dissent, the majority also failed to explore the impor-
tance of these supposed governmental objectives, counter to its analysis
in previous gender-based equal protection claims. Justice O'Connor
agreed that while it is important to validate the biological relationship
between a parent and child where the potential for fraudulent citizenship
exists, the Court did not discuss or explore that issue. 149 Moreover, Jus-
tice O'Connor rejected the Court's justification of the statute on the basis
of assuring the opportunity for a meaningful relationship, stating that "it
is questionable whether such an opportunity qualifies as an 'important'
governmental interest apart from the existence of an actual relation-
ship.' 150 In other words, the dissent accepted the notion that the parent-
child relationship itself was an important interest, but not merely the op-
portunity for such a relationship.
The majority opinion's greatest flaw, in the dissent's eyes, was its fail-
ure to adequately analyze the means-end and to insist on a tighter nexus
between the two.15 ' Rather than applying the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" standard by closely examining the nexus between the
means-end, the Court merely declared the statute's gender-based distinc-
tions "exceedingly persuasive" and dismissed the availability of gender-
neutral alternatives which it has, in the past, deemed "highly probative of
the validity of the classification.' 52 The dissent noted that the advanced
governmental interests could have been achieved through a number of
gender-neutral alternatives, such as requiring regular contact between the
citizen parent and the child for a certain period of time; dismissing com-
pliance with the formal requirements under the statute once the father-
145. Id. at 2068.
146. Id. at 2069.
147. Id. at 2060-61.
148. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
149. Id. at 2069.
150. Id. at 2072.
151. Id. at 2069.
152. Id. at 2068. The majority stated, "to require Congress to speak without reference
to gender of the parent with regard to its objective ...would be to insist on a hollow
neutrality." Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061. In contrast, the dissent noted that this is the "very
neutrality that the law requires." Id. at 2071.
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child relationship is established; or requiring both parents' acknowledge-
ment of the birth. 153 For the dissent, the majority's failure to examine
and insist on these gender-neutral alternatives pointed to the application
of rational basis rather an intermediate review.
Though the dissent's accusations against the Court are, as demon-
strated, well-founded and, in the author's view, correct, what the dissent-
ing opinion fails to address is why the majority Justices utilized this lower
standard of review. As mentioned, one possible justification finds its ba-
sis in the plenary power doctrine discussed below.
B. SCHOLARLY SPECULATION: THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
The plenary power argument advanced by some commentators' 54 is a
plausible but, in the end, an unlikely justification for the result in Nguyen.
Supporters of this argument assert that the Court used a lower standard
of review (i.e., rational basis) because it was acting deferentially to Con-
gress' broad powers to regulate matters concerning immigration and nat-
uralization. 155 Generally, that doctrine dictates that Congress has plenary
powers "to make policies and rules for exclusions of aliens,"'1 56 and the
courts will use a deferential standard of review when examining cases
involving congressional plenary authority.
The plenary power doctrine has deep historical roots in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, dating back to 1889 in the Chinese Exclusion Case,15 7
where the Court held that "the power of excluding aliens was a sovereign
power delegated exclusively to Congress by the Constitution."1 58 This
exclusion power, however, is "not explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution." 159
The Court coined the phrase "plenary congressional power"' 160 in the
1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel.16 1 There, two doctrines were in con-
flict: Congress' plenary power and the First Amendment. 162 A majority
of the Court essentially held that the plenary power doctrine trumps the
First Amendment, and a deferential standard of review in the context of
immigration and naturalization has dominated ever since. 163 Under this
standard of review, the government must only show that it had "a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason" for using its powers negatively. 164 Jus-
153. Id. at 2074.
154. See generally Clay M. West, Nguyen v. INS: Is Sex Really More Important Now?,
19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 525, 536-37 (2001).
155. See generally Collin O'Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright: Plenary Power, Equal
Protection, and the Rights of An Alien Love Child, 12 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 621(1998).
156. Kiendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
157. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
158. See Udell, supra note 155, at 622.
159. Id. at 621-22.
160. Id. at 623.
161. 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972)
162. Id. at 754.
163. Id. at 769-70.
164. Id. at 769.
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tice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in Kliendienst, arguing
that the Constitution-rather than a judicially created doctrine-should
govern where the rights of American citizens are concerned. 165 In other
words, the higher standard of review should apply when the enumerated
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens are at stake.
Throughout the decades, the Court has been divided over the applica-
tion of the plenary power doctrine and how much weight it should be
given. Moreover, whether the doctrine trumps other constitutional prin-
ciples, such as equal protection, when both are pitted against one other
has not yet been fully resolved. 166 The question is an important one since
in a case like Nguyen, for example, the Court may use a more deferential
standard of review than intermediate scrutiny if it determines that the
plenary power doctrine dominates. Though this doctrine serves as a plau-
sible explanation for the Court's decision to uphold the facially discrimi-
natory statute at issue in Nguyen, it seems highly unlikely for two reasons.
First, and most obvious, the Court explicitly stated that it was not rely-
ing on the plenary power doctrine in that case. 167 Justice Kennedy noted
that "[t]he statutory scheme's satisfaction of the equal protection scrutiny
we apply to gender-based classifications constitutes a sufficient basis for
upholding it."' 168 As such, the Court "need not decide whether some
lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates Congress'
immigration and naturalization power." 169 Based on these statements,
the Court at least claims it did not use deferential review under the ple-
nary power doctrine to reach its conclusion in Nguyen.
Second, Justice Scalia's plenary power analysis in Miller v. Albright was
joined only by Justice Thomas. 170 As some commentators have noted, it
would appear that only a minority of the Justices on the current Court
believe that the plenary power doctrine trumps equal protection. 17 1
Moreover, other commentators believe that the strength of the plenary
power doctrine has been eroding over the years.' 72 When looking back
to the Kleindeinst case, scholars tend to agree with Justice Marshall's dis-
sent discussing the scope of Congress' exclusion powers, and they argue
that the traditional three-tiered approach in equal protection cases should
apply rather than deferential review.'173 On the surface, a current major-
ity of the Court also appears to take this position, as evidenced by the
Miller decision where only two Justices applied the doctrine. As one
165. Id. Justice Marshall distinguished the Kliendeinst case from the Chinese Exclusion
Case in support of his argument. In the latter case, the rights of aliens were implicated,
whereas in Kleindeinst, the First Amendment rights of American citizens were at stake.
Kleindeinst, 408 U.S. at 781-83.
166. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059; see generally Udell, supra note 155.
167. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059.
168. Id. at 2065.
169. Id.
170. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 453.
171. Id. at 452; see also Udell, supra note 155, at 650.
172. See Udell, supra note 155, at 655 (discussing Legomsky).
173. Id. at 653.
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scholar has observed about the Miller decision, "[f]or the first time, Sec-
tion 1409 (a) was portrayed by seven of the nine justices as falling outside
the scope of traditional immigration jurisprudence (a view not shared by
the Court of Appeals when it considered the case below)."' 174 Thus, both
scholarly support and past decisions in this area tend to support the argu-
ment that the plenary power doctrine does not justify the Court's holding
in Nguyen.
It is crucial to note, however, that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in Nguyen left open what effect the plenary power doctrine has on equal
protection claims. At the close of his opinion, Justice Kennedy stated
that if the Court had not determined that § 1409 (a)(4) survived interme-
diate scrutiny, Nguyen and his father "would face additional obstacles
before they could prevail." 175 For example, "[t]here may well be 'poten-
tial problems with fashioning a remedy' were [the Court] to find the stat-
ute unconstitutional."1 76 After discussing Justice Scalia's plenary power
arguments advanced in Miller, Justice Kennedy explained that the Court
"need not rely on this argument" in the Nguyen case and "need not assess
the implications of statements in [the Court's] earlier cases regarding the
wide deference afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immigration
and naturalization power."' 77 In other words, he reserved the question of
whether the plenary power doctrine trumps equal protection for another
day, and currently there is justification and precedent 78 for the Court to
rule either way.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the Nguyen decision raises even more
cause for concern. If the Court had used the plenary power doctrine to
justify its holding, then at least Nguyen could be distinguished from past
decisions like Virginia. Instead, as it stands now, we are left searching for
a justification and a way to reconcile these cases. One possible explana-
tion, though perhaps less palatable, is offered in the following section.
C. THE MAJORITY: FIVE JUSTICES FIGHT TO PULL IN THE REINS
Rather than asking if the majority applied a lower level of scrutiny in
Nguyen, the more interesting question is whether the Justices are even on
174. Id. at 655.
175. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2065.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (holding that the challenged laws distinguish-
ing between mother and fathers of illegitimate children were not unconstitutional since
Congress has broad powers over immigration and naturalization matters). But see Nguyen,
121 S. Ct. at 2078 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fiallo is readily distinguishable
from Nguyen as a case concerning the admission of aliens into the United States and not
whether an individual is a U.S. citizen). Justice O'Connor's position is not without support.
See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, the majority in Fiallo rec-
ognized that "'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."' Id. at 792 (internal citation omitted). Based on this language and Justices Mar-
shall and O'Connor's dissents, it is highly credible that the Court would rule that the ple-
nary power doctrine should not come into play when the constitutional rights of American
citizens are at stake.
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the same page when they use the term "intermediate scrutiny." Based on
the Court's decisions over the last decade, it appears they are not. More-
over, they seem to realize they are not. With that in mind, perhaps
Nguyen represents a judicial effort to clarify what a majority of the Jus-
tices believe is, or should be, intermediate scrutiny. Put differently, this
article argues that the Nguyen decision is meant to contain Justice Gins-
burg's majority opinion in Virginia and to limit the scope of the "exceed-
ingly persuasive" standard. It is clear that some Justices feel that
standard is the catalyst for a new level of "skeptical scrutiny," which has
the potential of allowing the Court to declare gender a suspect class.
Nguyen, in a nutshell, is five Justices' attempt to stop that result.
As previously discussed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has never supported
using the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard to impose a
higher burden on the traditional intermediate test.179 This comes as no
surprise since he did not fully approve of intermediate scrutiny from the
start. In Craig v. Boren, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent strongly op-
posed the introduction of intermediate scrutiny, at least where the alleged
discrimination was against men. Rather than apply the intermediate stan-
dard evenhandedly to all gender-based claims, Chief Justice Rehnquist
sought to limit its application to discrimination against women while us-
ing rational basis review in the context of male discrimination. 180 Thus, it
is quite obvious that when Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stew-
art's majority opinion in Massachusetts v. Feeney, which first used the "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" language, he had no intention of
imposing an even higher standard on the intermediate test, particularly in
cases like Nguyen where the alleged discrimination was against males.
In United States v. Virginia, Chief Justice Rehnquist unequivocally
stated his position regarding the proper use of the "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" language:
While terms like "important governmental objective" and "substan-
tially related" are hardly models of precision, they have more con-
tent and specificity than does the phrase "exceedingly persuasive
justification." That phrase is best confined, as it was first used [in
Feeney] as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable
test, not as a formulation of the test itself.181
Based on these statements, a plausible argument can be made that Chief
Justice Rehnquist viewed the Nguyen case as an opportunity to put the
"exceedingly persuasive" language in what he deems is its proper place-
a mere description of the traditional intermediate test. And apparently
he was not without support.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas routinely concurs, has also
been quite assertive about his distaste for this language. It was, in fact, a
dominant reason for Justice Scalia's sole and scathing dissent in Virginia,
179. See supra note 86.
180. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559.
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a decision in which Justice Thomas did not participate. In all fairness to
Justice Scalia, he has at least been forthright about his general dislike for
the entire three-tiered approach used in the equal protection context. As
he stated in Virginia:
I shall devote most of my analysis to evaluating the Court's opinion
on the basis of our current equal protection jurisprudence, which re-
gards the Court as free to evaluate everything under the sun by ap-
plying one of three tests: "rational basis" scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. These tests are no more scientific than
their names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added
by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will apply in each
case. 182
Despite this view, Justice Scalia has applied the various levels of scru-
tiny as precedent dictates, but he has apparently drawn the line at the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" language, at least in the way it was
utilized in Virginia. In that case, Justice Scalia took issue with the major-
ity using this "amorphous"' 8 3 language to hold VMI's single-sex admis-
sions policy unconstitutional rather than applying traditional
intermediate scrutiny, which he believed the admissions policy survived.
His dissent reiterated that the intermediate scrutiny analysis should focus
on the "substantially related to an important governmental objective"
language and not the "exceedingly persuasive justification."'' 84 Justice
Scalia could not have been more clear that he wanted to limit the Court's
application of this phrase. For example, in Virginia, he stated:
Although the Court in two places recites the [intermediate] test as
stated in Hogan ... the Court never answers the question presented
in anything resembling that form. When it engages in analysis, the
Court instead prefers the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justfica-
tion" from Hogan. The Court's nine invocations of that phrase, and
even its fanciful description of that imponderable as "the core in-
struction" of the Court's [previous] decisions would be unobjection-
able if the Court acknowledged that whether a "justification" is
"exceedingly persuasive" must be assessed by asking "[whether] the
classification serves important governmental objectives and[whether] the discriminatory means employed are substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives." Instead, however, the
Court proceeds to interpret "exceedingly persuasive justification" in
a fashion that contradicts the reasoning of Hogan and our other
precedents. 185
Considering his position in Virginia, it is not shocking that Justice
Scalia upheld the statute at issue in Nguyen. It must be noted, however,
that this time Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion even though he
still believed the Court lacked the power to grant a remedy to Nguyen
under the plenary power doctrine. Justice Scalia did write an additional
182. Id. at 567.
183. Id. at 573.
184. Id. at 576.
185. Id. at 571-72 (internal citations omitted).
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concurrence to assert his plenary power argument, but at the same time
he and Justice Thomas prevented another plurality decision like Miller by
joining the other three Justices.
Unlike Justice Stevens' concurrence in Nguyen, which was expected
since he wrote the majority opinion in Miller, Justice Kennedy's opinion
in Nguyen was surprising, particularly since he authored the majority
opinion. Commentators and some Members of the Court believed that
when the facts of Miller arose again without any issue as to standing, a
majority of the Justices would strike down § 1409(a), "one of the last re-
maining sex-based classifications in the corpus of federal law."'81 6 In fact,
in his Miller dissent, Justice Breyer seemed confident that "a majority of
the Court [did] not share 'Justice Stevens' assessment that the provision
withstands heightened scrutiny."' 187 He went so far as to state that "'[i]t
is unlikely' that 'gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive
heightened [intermediate] scrutiny,' a view shared by at least five Mem-
bers of this Court."'1 88 The Court itself appears to have been caught off-
guard by Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Nguyen. But the question
still remains what caused his switch.
In retrospect, Justice Kennedy's silent concurrence in Miller is quite
telling. There is little doubt that he concurred with Justice O'Connor on
the lack of standing in that case, but it is now evident that he did not join
her dicta describing § 1409(a) as failing intermediate scrutiny. In light of
this, one questions why Justice Kennedy did not write a separate concur-
ring opinion agreeing with the standing issue while disassociating himself
from Justice O'Connor's statements regarding the statute's invalidity.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy himself had not yet decided where he stood on
the issue, or perhaps the other four Justices persuaded him of the need to
rope-in the "exceedingly persuasive" language.
When examining Justice Kennedy's opinions both before and after Vir-
ginia, maybe his decision in Nguyen is not be so surprising. In J.E.B. v.
Alabama, he did quote Justice Rehnquist's dissent from Craig v. Boren,
saying that "the intermediate scrutiny standard may not provide a very
clear standard in all instances." 18 9 Perhaps Justice Kennedy was hinting
at what he believed was happening to that standard with the introduction
of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" language. But at that point,
Justice Kennedy did not appear willing to let the murkiness of this stan-
dard influence the "strong presumption that gender classifications are in-
valid."'190 So what, then, changed between his concurring opinion in
J.E.B. and his majority opinion in Nguyen, which led to two very different
results? The answer is almost too obvious: United States v. Virginia and
Justice Ginsburg's heavy reliance on an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
186. The Harvard Law Review Association, 115 HARV. L. REV. 376, 377 (2001).
187. Miller, 523 U.S. at 476.
188. Id. (emphasis added). In addition to himself, Justice Breyer was referring to Jus-
tices O'Connor, Ginsburg, Souter, and Kennedy.




tion." It appears that Justice Kennedy-like Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens-also disapproves of the Court's use
of that language. Though he has never explicitly stated as much, his
authoring of the Nguyen decision leaves little doubt about where Justice
Kennedy now stands on this issue.
VII. THE IMPACT OF NGUYEN ON FUTURE GENDER-BASED
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
With these five Justices forming a majority, the question remains
whether they will continue their efforts to extinguish the "exceedingly
persuasive" standard. For all those who reveled in the Virginia decision
and what it meant for women-and men-both legally and socially, the
Nguyen opinion stands as a symbol of regression, reminding us of one
solemn fact: although thirty years have passed since Justice Brennan first
tried to gather a majority in Frontiero to declare gender a suspect class,
the Supreme Court is still not willing to make that determination.
Of course, no one can say with certainty how the Court will rule in
future gender-based equal protection claims since much of that depends
on the facts of a given case, who sits on the Supreme Court at that time,
and how much societal attention a particular issue is given. But consider-
ing the Court as it sits now, one can make a strong argument that a ma-
jority of the Court is reverting back to a pre-Virginia application of
intermediate scrutiny, i.e., that the challenged classification serves "im-
portant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."' 91 And unless one of these five Justices decides to switch
sides (again), the "exceedingly persuasive justification" will most likely
not serve as the Court's "core instruction" in the future-and that is as-
suming it remains part of its instruction at all.
Some scholars may not find this troublesome, as they perceive no real
difference between the traditional intermediate level of scrutiny and the
"exceedingly persuasive" standard. There are also those who share Jus-
tice Scalia's view that intermediate scrutiny was being invaded by a
stricter and more "imponderable" test. But for those of us who believe a
difference between the two standards does exist, the possibility that the
Court will return to a pre-Virginia analysis of gender-based equal protec-
tion claims is disturbing since ultimately this means that more discrimina-
tory laws, like the one at issue in Nguyen, will be upheld.
What we are left with, then, is hope that Justice O'Connor's final words
in Nguyen will prove true:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful applica-
tion of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-
based classifications. Today's decision instead represents a deviation
from a line of cases in which we have vigilantly applied heightened
191. Id. at 2059.
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scrutiny to such classifications to determine whether a constitutional
violation has occurred. I trust that the depth and vitality of prece-
dents will ensure that today's error remains an aberration.
192
The concern, of course, is that the Nguyen decision will not "remain an
aberration," as the dissent hopes. And until the Court renders its next
decision in another gender-based equal protection claim, we are left to
ponder, quite apprehensively, the significance and force of Nguyen.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is one thing when the Members of the Court disagree amongst them-
selves about a particular decision; it is altogether something different
when some of the Justices ask the public to disregard a majority decision
as precedent, as did Justice O'Connor and her fellow Nguyen dissenters.
Stepping back for a moment, both sides of the Court (Justices Ginsburg,
O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter on the one side, and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Stevens and Kennedy on the other)
share equal fault in creating the current predicament.
Arguably, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Virginia stretched precedent in
much the same way Justice Kennedy's opinion in Nguyen narrowed it.
One can argue that Nguyen is simply correcting a long line of decisions
that Virginia sought to distort, and the five majority Justices in Nguyen
are merely trying to restore the traditional intermediate standard. But
these arguments ignore the fact that Virginia is on the books and that five
Justices appear unwilling to follow it.
To prevent any further undermining of its decisions in this area, the
Court must reach agreement on precisely what intermediate scrutiny
means. Moreover, rather than obscuring their differences about the "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" in published opinions-which ends up
agitating precedent-the Court should first determine how that language
fits into the intermediate test, if at all, before issuing its next opinion. At
the very least, the Justices should express their views about the "exceed-
ingly persuasive" standard more directly, as some have done, so cases like
Nguyen may be reconciled with and distinguished from precedent. Until
then, commentators will continue to view decisions like Nguyen as unpre-
dictable and precarious, and the Court will continue to lose its credibility.
192. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
1779
1780 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
